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Abstract 
The study of traveller behaviour has blossomed into a multi-disciplinary array of theories, methods and data paradigms aimed at 
improving our understanding of drivers of passenger and freight movement. While progress continues unabated, there remains 
the challenge of extracting more behavioural richness out of the way in which we work to understand the nuances of preference 
revelation and hence choice making. In this paper we discuss a number of ways of gaining an increased understanding of 
behavioural response. The paper is a thought piece in line with the role played as a plenary presentation at the Travel Survey 
Methods Conference. 
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1. Introduction 
The most complex element of travel behaviour studies is the human being. While we may never be in a position to 
fully explain the next response that each individual might make to a changing set of circumstances designed to 
influence trip making, in the short, medium and long term, we now have a growing body of theoretical and 
empirical evidence that is suggestive of possible paths of response and what are some of the key drivers of change 
and/or reinforcement of habitual behaviour. The existing literature recognises a growing number of areas of fruitful 
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research endeavour that have not been given enough attention in travel behaviour studies and in travel survey 
design, and which should move from what one might describe as fringe interests to a central role in the toolkit used 
by travel survey methods specialists.  
This paper, as an interpretation of a plenary address, summarises a number of such themes that should be 
highlighted for serious consideration in the design of travel surveys. The selection of themes includes uncertainty 
and subjective probability and a return to a greater role for revealed preference data compared to the growing 
influence of stated choice data, the complexity of choice experiments contrasted with the relevance of information, 
herding behaviour, behavioural insights and nudging, and the appeal of supplementary response variables in choice 
studies such as awareness, familiarity, and acceptability of alternatives. 
 
2. The process of modeling decisions under uncertainty 
 
The great majority of travel choice studies and aligned data sets are snapshot interpretations of choice making 
activity that typically assume that all decisions taken are associated with risk neutrality. Although it is common to 
assume that individuals are, on balance, substantially risk averse, with some exceptions under risk taking, the 
recognition and hence testing for risk attitude should be encouraged, especially where there is a growing relevance 
attached to circumstances that question the real behavioural value of simplistic assumptions such as certainty of 
travel times on the road network (i.e., trip time variability†) and getting a seat on public transport (i.e., the crowding 
variability effect).  
Recognising risk is one thing, but extending the data collection exercise and modelling opportunity to 
accommodate uncertainty is quite different. Specifically, risk is associated with a known or assumed occurrence 
(probability) distribution, whereas uncertainty relates to an unknown distribution that is guided by sources of 
ambiguity aversion (also known as source preference – see Fox and Tversky 1998). Fundamentally, risk is 
conditioned by uncertainty. In seeking out ways to incorporate uncertainty into choice modelling, we begin by 
asking the question: what sort of data might we need to be able to do this? Central to the answer is evidence on 
subjective probability associated with the occurrence of attribute levels such as travel times and getting a seat. The 
most common response is to build this into a stated choice experiment; however given the subjective (or perceived) 
nature of such information, this may not be possible. Choice experiments impose levels on attributes in general 
(hence this is objective data), although such experiments are able to establish revealed levels for an experienced 
(status quo or reference) alternative but not for the designed alternatives. Fundamentally, uncertainty (linked to 
subjective probability) is difficult to measure and hence capture (maybe impossible?) in a choice experiment. 
Taking travel time variability as an example which requires data on travel times (Attributes (A)) and the associated 
occurrence of each travel time (Probabilities (P)), these two items can be measured as objective or subjective 
constructs as summarised in Table 1 (from Hensher et al. 2015). As objective constructs they are imposed within the 
design and respondents are asked to assess the given levels. Given that choice experiments impose attribute levels 
through a designed structure, it appears not possible to see respondent perceptions on levels of attributes, and thus 
only level i is permissible. Whether objective (O) levels designed into choice experiments can be used as proxies for 
subjective (S) levels, offering the ability to treat the choice experiment as a source of data to accommodate the role 
of risk and uncertainty is an empirical issue that has, as far as I am aware, not been systematically investigated.  
 
Table 1 Four levels of subjectivity and objectivity of data 
Level i FO      = OPs+OAs 
Level ii PS(1)  = OPs+SAs 
Level iii PS(2)  = SPs+OAs 
Level iv FS      = SPs+SAs 
Notes: FO: fully objective, PS(1): Partially subjective; PS(2): Partially subjective, FS: fully subjective; SPs: Subjective 
probabilities, SAs: Subjective attributes; OPs : Objective probabilities, OAs: Objective attributes. Source preference = sources 
of uncertainty ambiguity 
 
 
† On two days that I drafted this paper my journey work was 35 mins and 2 hours – the latter due to an accident on the Sydney 
harbour bridge). 
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What this discussion does suggest, however, is that it might be time to revisit revealed preference data with a 
fresh perspective, given that subjective measures of attributes and their occurrence can be more readily obtained for 
experienced and non-experienced alternatives. Given the growing recognition of the role of uncertainty as 
embellished by the classic statement by Ellsberg (1961, p 659), namely “An individual . . . can always assign 
relative likelihoods to the states of nature. But how does he act in the presence of uncertainty? The answer to that 
may depend on another judgment, about the reliability, credibility, or adequacy of his information (including his 
relevant experience, advice and intuition) as a whole.”, the ability of a revealed preference approach to account for 
uncertainty offers much appeal. The types of data required are best summarised in Figure 1 (from Fox and Tversky 
1998, see also Heath and Tversky 1991), which translates into a simple survey instrument such as the screen in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Process to recognise uncertainty in choice making 
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Fig. 2. Illustrative data screen to obtain data associated with uncertainty 
 
 
A theme that is central to uncertainty and risk is believability of the evidence (Hensher et al. 2013). Heath and 
Tvsersky (1991) explain what they call a competence hypothesis, which states that people prefer to bet on their own 
vague beliefs in situations in which they feel they have more knowledge. In this context, Fox and Tversky (1998) 
propose a general belief-based approach to decision making under uncertainty as a transformation of the judged 
probability, as given in (1) which is a representation of the lower half of Figure 1. 
 
                 (1) 
 
  > 0 is an estimated parameter which is inversely related to the attractiveness of the source, P(A) reflects a 
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person’s belief in the likelihood of the outcome, and   reflects a person´s preference to bet on that belief. Hence, 
this latter takes into account the influence of behavioural sources on preference revelation in terms of deviations 
from the given and (subjective) judged probabilities for the belief weight function, referred to as uncertainty 
ambiguity. This parameter can be considered as a function of other characteristics of the individual. 
To obtain data to identify the probability weighting process under uncertainty, the first step is to ask respondents 
to provide their judged (subjective) probabilities (sprobm) of target events, and the second step is to weight those 
judged probabilities by using a nonlinear probability weighting function for risk (i.e., risky weighting function as 
given by α in equation 2) as is common in prospect theory applications (see Rasouli and Timmermans 2014 for a 
review of the popular functional forms, and Li and Hensher 2015 for a generalised form that can reveal the 
‘statistically best’ functional form). The distinction between decision under risk and uncertainty is captured in the 
further transformation of decision weights, which indicates individuals’ source preference through the source 
preference parameter (θ) which can itself be a function of other judgments (e.g., beliefs).  
This modelling process integrates two essential components of research in behavioural decision theory: (i) the 
analysis of decision under risk (e.g., decision weights in Prospect Theory and Rank-Dependent Utility Theory 
w(pi)), and (ii) the study of judgment under uncertainty (e.g., subjective probability and belief prospects). It also 
extends Prospect Theory by teasing apart the role of personal belief and source preference (sources of uncertainty 
ambiguity) in the weighting process. A Model with Source Preference (θ) can be a function of context otherwise it is 
a sample mean effect. An example of a functional form to be estimated that captures these processes is given in 
equation (2), where SEEUT is the subjective extended expected utility theoretic model. This model is implemented 
in Hensher et al. (2015). 
 
  (2) 
 
α is risk attitude. Specifically, a popular model form considers that individuals display a constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA), which means that the attitude toward risk is affected by the values of the outcomes constituting 
the prospect. This form may be defined by a general power specification (see Holt and Laury 2002; Hensher et al. 
2012) as given in equation (3). 
 
              (3) 
 
When using Equation (3), if α is equal to 0 the model collapses to a linear function, which means that individuals in 
the sample are on average risk neutral, and this parameter has to be different from 1. If α is negative the results 
would suggest that individuals are on average risk takers. If α is positive, then the individuals in the sample would 
be on average risk averse. This interpretation is appropriate only when the risk attitude included is considered for an 
attribute that represents a bigger loss (higher benefit) when its levels are higher (smaller). This is important to note 
since this interpretation may be different to other studies in a similar context. For example, we could consider 
CRRA risk attitudes towards the pricing associated with various schemes describing road pricing reform.  This 
allows for the variation in the pricing levels shown to an individual to influence their decision. That is, if a person is 
risk averse, the value assigned to small pricing levels will be similar to each other, but at a certain point (depending 
on how risk averse the person is) the value assigned will increase at a high rate. This is represented by the purple 
line in Fig. 3. For a person who is a risk taker, the value assigned for high pricing levels would be similar, but for 
low pricing levels the difference between them will be much higher. This situation is represented by the red line in 
Fig. 3. This Figure is given as an example to illustrate possible risk attitudes, where x represents the pricing level in 
our example (which can take a value between 0 and 1), and U(x) is the value assigned by the individual.  
 
 1 1 1
1 1 2 1( ) [ ( ) ( ) ... ( ) ] / (1 )x R RSEEUT U w p x w p x w p x
θ α θ α θ αβ α− − −= + + + −
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Fig. 3. Example of risk attitudes 
3. Complexity vs. relevance in choice experiments 
There is a great deal of what I would describe as paranoia about the ‘complexity’ of stated choice experiments. 
There are proponents who would suggest that a few attributes (e.g., three) and two or three alternatives is about as 
much as a respondent can handle, whilst other analysts are supportive of more attributes and alternatives (see Figure 
4 for examples of choice sets with many attributes). What is often missing in the debate are the criteria that should 
be used in defining the dimensions of choice experiments, apart from the broad belief in choice experiments being 
‘comprehensive’ and ‘comprehendable’. Some studies partition the attribute set and show respondents a number of 
different choice sets that contain a partial set of attributes. The issue of transitivity and hence comparability is at risk 
in such situations.  
 
What should dictate the dimensionality of choice experiments is the ‘relevance’ of attributes and it should 
prevail over complexity (Hensher 2014). Relevancy suggests comprehensiveness, provided there are no crucial 
attributes that have been excluded. Indeed, respondents often struggle with a choice response that is a true reflection 
of their preferences, which are often based on consideration of other attributes that are not revealed but which 
contaminate the assessment of the offered attributes. The challenge then becomes one of presenting the information 
in a way that is comprehendable. This requires creative formats and extensive piloting of the instrument to ensure 
that the data has meaning in the way it is planned to be used. 
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Fig. 4. a-c Examples of choice scenarios – complex or relevant? 
 
Relevancy does not suggest that all attributes as offered are considered in the revelation of preferences and 
choices. What is at stake here, however, is the risk of limiting the number of attributes to a common set which 
results in maintaining some attributes that are not relevant to a sub sample, while excluding some attributes that are 
relevant to another sub sample. To accommodate this concern, the overlay of attribute processing in the presence of 
an extended set of attributes provides one way to minimise the possibility that relevant attributes are excluded and 
hence are not able to be attended to. An example of attribute processing is to allow an attribute associated with an 
alternative to be greyed out prior to making a choice. Experience suggests that specific attributes are greyed out 
between 10 and 40 percent of the time. It would be ideal if this could be undertaken as part of a larger pilot study, 
and then the findings used as a basis of establishing the candidate set of attributes that apply to the majority of the 
sample, allowing removal of any attributes or levels that are likely to add very little to the overall preference 
modelling exercise. Importantly, this method not only provides insight in respect of attributes but also in 
establishing meaningful levels for attributes. 
More complex designs, in terms of the number of attributes, also tend to minimise (if not eliminate) the presence 
of dominance, which is typically the results of a few attributes in a design. This is linked to the debate on the 
presence of non-trading, which dissipates when one adds attributes. These aspects of the design of choice 
experiments led Collins et al. (2104) to discuss how choice experiments can incorporate behavioural constraints 
which may in part compromise statistical efficiency, albeit for good reason. One such constraint involves the 
elimination of choice tasks in which one alternative dominates the others, which can occur in choice experiments 
and is likely to be more evident in relatively simply designs in respect of only a few attributes. 
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4. Challenging attributes that matter - some appealing enhancements to data collection 
4.1 Acceptability of alternatives 
In designing choice experiments, it is common to present a fixed number of alternatives to a respondent and have 
them rank these alternatives or choose the most preferred alternative. However, the offered alternatives, including 
the one that is ranked as most preferred, may not always be acceptable (Rose et al. 2015, Beck et al. 2013); it may 
simply be the best of a poor set on offer. Although the acceptability of an alternative may influence the processing 
strategies used by the respondents in revealing their preferences, there has been a limited amount of inquiry into the 
overall relevance of imposed alternatives in stated choice studies in contrast to the literature on choice set formation, 
especially in revealed preference studies (Hensher and Ho 2015). 
An acceptability of an alternative response is similar to the notion of consideration sets. The inclusion of the 
acceptability of an alternative (however defined) is effectively an additional endogenous choice response as 
suggested in recent papers by Hess et al. (in progress) and Rose et al. (2015). This literature posits that when 
making decisions, people first identify an acceptable set of alternatives (alternative acceptability), known as a 
consideration set in the broader literature (especially in marketing research), and it is from this reduced set that the 
final choice is typically made. This is in line with the literature on choice set formation set out mainly in the context 
of revealed preference data (see Manski 1977 and Swait and Ben Akiva 1987). Rose et al. (2015) show that joint 
estimation allows the modeller to overcome potential endogeneity bias that may exist between these responses. 
Their findings suggest a large number of differences between parameters associated with the alternatives deemed to 
be acceptable and those associated with alternatives reported as being unacceptable to the respondent. The authors 
also conclude that what might be thought of as preference heterogeneity may be linked to the overall acceptability of 
an alternative.  
Hensher and Ho (2015) investigate the relationship between the attribute levels associated with an alternative 
offered in a choice experiment and the construction of a respondent’s choice set based on the alternatives considered 
through the acceptability response dummy variable. They find that the attribute dimensionality across the 
alternatives (i.e., the context-dependent effects) plays a major role in sanitising the full choice set offered, and as a 
form of preference heterogeneity they suggest that this should improve the predictive performance of the model 
applications, in contrast to assuming all alternatives offered in a stated choice experiment are always considered by 
all sampled respondents. This, however, comes with an assumption that factors influencing the consideration set are 
reasonably stable over time. They conclude that the extent to which the identification of a choice set actually 
processed by each respondent increases model performance and prediction constitutes a fruitful area for ongoing 
research.  
 
4.2 Herding behaviour 
 
Individuals are often described as ‘creatures of habit’ with a tendency to follow rather than lead. The growing 
interest in this view, in the finance literature in particular, highlights the strength of following through on the notion 
of herding behaviour. Essentially, herding recognises that each decision maker looks at the decisions made by 
previous decision makers in taking their own decision (and can include hypothetical testing). People will be doing 
what others are doing (or saying they do or plan to do) rather than using their information. For example, academics 
choose to research on topics that are currently ‘hot’ or ‘very hot’. This phenomenon is also referred to as 
information cascading. For example, “If they like it then maybe I will like it” and “Getting carried away with the 
crowd”.  
Models of group polarisation (including household and peer influences) should recognise herding effects or 
information cascades generated by observing others’ choices, as this information may alter the assessed probabilities 
and consequently affect decisions in the group environment. Even when people have full, accurate, knowledge of 
the probabilities, observing others’ choices may however create a risky shift which should be captured in choice 
studies. 
Including an attribute in choice experiments that describes the percent take up (like information acceleration) of 
an alternative (relevant for labelled alternatives) is one possible way of gaining an understanding of the follower 
mentality aligned with herding behaviour. 
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4.3 Behavioural insights and nudging 
 
Nudge theory (or Nudging) argues that positive reinforcement and indirect suggestions to try to achieve non-
forced compliance can influence the motives, incentives and decision making of groups and individuals alike, at 
least as effectively, if not more effectively, than direct instruction, legislation, or enforcement. A nudge, is any 
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options 
or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and 
cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not. It 
is closely linked to herd behaviour; for example, “Did you know that Fred [your best mate] tried the bus last week 
and it was much quicker than the car.” 
Nudging as a centrepiece of what is referred to as the literature on ‘behavioural insights’ can provide guidance 
on how to influence travel behaviour. It does this by taking an evidence-based approach. For example, using 
behavioural insights can help to maximise the behavioural response to a communications campaign; increase the 
effectiveness of personalised travel planning or other behaviour change programmes; increase the rate of adoption of 
a new service; and improve our ability to forecast the impact of measures designed to influence behaviour. 
Nudging also relates to the nature of wording in survey instruments, with specific wording designed to influence 
travel behaviour in a way that some might describe as coercive and targeted. As an example, based on Alverini 
(2009), we can present three ways to ask a modal choice question (known as framing of choice outcomes) 
A. Commuting by car will take 20 minutes; Cycle-commuting will take 15 minutes, 
B. Commuting by car will take 20 minutes; Choosing to commute by bike, your journey will be 5 minutes shorter, 
and  
C. Cycle-commuting will take 15 minutes; Choosing to commute by car, your journey will be 5 minutes longer 
The so-called rational choice model will view all wording as the same (i.e., classical economics cannot predict 
differences). It is hence difficult to predict how ‘unframed’ information on the options (alternative A) will be 
interpreted and used by the traveller. Framing cycling as a choice that carries possible gain (as illustrated in 
alternative B), or the even stronger nudge (alternative C) where the choice of commuting by car is framed as a loss, 
are ways to make cycling appear more attractive than the alternative. None of the information formats impose a 
restriction of the travel options for the traveller. However, they are encouraged to choose the option which is 
considered to be preferable.  In summary, nudges can help overcome cognitive bias, highlight better choices and 
increase the effect of behavioural change without restricting choices. 
 
4.4 Familiarity and awareness 
 
When the analyst assumes that all attributes offered in a choice experiment are relevant, there is an implicit sense 
that the respondent has complete familiarity or awareness of both the alternatives on offer and the context within 
which a choice is being made. A classic example where this fails is the debate on road pricing reform, which is 
substantively not understood by the majority of respondents, certainly in Australia (Hensher et al. 2013). The value 
of identifying respondent awareness and/or familiarity seems appealing to behavioural study as a way of 
establishing the extent to which better information will improve awareness and familiarity in a way that might 
engender greater support for a reform package. This is a sensible position for studies interested in stakeholder buy 
in. 
Survey methodologists should consider this matter and identify the appropriate ways to define awareness and 
familiarity. In a recent study on road pricing reform, for example, Hensher et al. (2013) defined awareness through 
the question “to what extent are you aware of what road pricing means?”, and familiarity through the question “how 
familiar are you with the debate on road pricing?” The response scale of these questions was a score between 0 
(totally unaware or unfamiliar respectively) and 100 (totally aware or familiar respectively). Balbontin et al. (2015) 
used this evidence to reconstruct a choice set of alternatives using a number of tested cut-offs for awareness and 
familiarity as additional endogenous response variables. The acceptability of an alternative was also used to 
construct a final set of choice alternatives, all of which were subject to a modelling framework that incorporated risk 
and uncertainty as set out earlier in this paper. The final model focussed only on awareness and not familiarity. 
The results, detailed in Balbontin et al. (2015) suggest that treating awareness and acceptability as endogenous 
variables is an appealing approach to analyse the alternative road pricing schemes. They also showed that when 
people are more aware of what road pricing is, they are more willing to support the schemes. Source preference was 
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considered as a function of the level of familiarity with the debate on road pricing and the number of weekly trips 
into the central city. When either of these increased, individuals’ had a tendency to underestimate w(pi) for a smaller 
range of pi. 
 
4.5 Real time information (acceleration) 
 
This phenomenon is linked to herding in that it reflects the commitment in the future by other people to a 
particular alternative that is not well known today. This can be considered in travel surveys through an attribute of 
value in projecting take up in real markets (switching behaviour). Participants can be given information say on the 
take up in 5, 10, 15 yrs of electric vehicles that enables them to observe the desired choice outcomes of others, and 
they can revise their choices based on these observations. The idea of ‘acceleration’ is to look forward in time and to 
tell respondents what is the expected take up rate of specific outcomes as a way of establishing if  a ‘follow the 
leader’ perspective influences choices. The point is that if more people are actively making a particular choice, will 
this inertia be enough to motivate a respondent to either take that alternative seriously and /or actually choose it. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper was prepared as a plenary address designed to highlight some real behavioural opportunities in the 
study of travel behaviour that can be better informed by specific survey data items that are commonly not included 
in travel surveys.  
Whilst one can always source at least one survey that has considered one or more of the themes addressed in this 
think piece, it is unlikely that we can witness a widespread uptake on such interesting and potentially important 
features of the ongoing search for a better understanding of choices made by individuals, households, and 
organisations more generally. The ongoing agenda should emphasis the reproducibility of empirical evidence to 
support specific research paths, a cornerstone of good science. 
In converting a plenary address to a formal paper there is always the risk that what came across as a strong point 
in the presentation may end up being somewhat diluted in the challenge to express a point in print. This is indeed the 
case, and as a result, the messages that have survived in the paper are essentially those that have passed my test of 
‘relevant endurance in conversion’.  
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